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IMPLEMENTING ARROW-DEBREU EQUILIBRIA BY
TRADING INFINITELY LIVED SECURITIES
Kevin X. D. Huang and Jan Werner

ABSTRACT

We show that Arrow-Debreu equilibria with countably additive pnces In
infinite-time economy under uncertainty can be implemented by trading infinitely-lived
securities in complete sequential markets under two different portfolio feasibility
constraints: wealth constraint, and essentially bounded portfolios. Sequential equilibria
with no price bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria, while those with price
bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria with transfers. Transfers are equal to the
value of price bubbles on initial portfolio holdings. Price bubbles may arise in sequential
equilibrium under the wealth constraint, but with essentially bounded portfolios.
Key words: Arrow-Debreu equilibrium; security markets equilibrium; price bubbles;
transfers

IMPLEMENTING ARROW-DEBREU EQUILIBRIA BY
TRADING INFINITELY LIVED SECURITIES l

1. Introduction
Equilibrium rnodels of dynamic competitive economies extending ov r iIlfilli te
time play an important role in contemporary economic theory. The basic solution concept for such models is the Arrow-Debreu (or Walrasian) equilibrium . In
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium it is assumed that agents simultaneously trade arbitrary
consumption plans for the entire infinite and state-contingent future. In applied
work, on the other hand, a different market structure and equilibrium concept
are used: instead of trading arbitrary consumption plans at a single date, agents
trade securities in sequential markets at every date in every event. The importance
of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium rests on the possibility of implementing equilibrium
allocations by trading suitable securities in sequential markets.
The idea of implementing an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation by trading
securi ties takes its origin in the classical paper by Arrow (1964). Arrow proved
that every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation in a two-date econorny can be
irnplemented by trading in complete security markets at the first date and spot
cornmodity markets at every date in every event. The implementation is exactthe sets of equilibrium allocations in the two market structures are exactly the
same. Arrow's result can be easily extended to a multidate economy with finite
time-horizon. Duffie and Huang (1985) proved that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can
be implemented by trading securities in continuous-time finite-horizon economy.
In this paper we study implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations
by sequential trading of infinitely-lived securities in an infinite-time economy. Our
results extend those of Kandori (1988), from the setting of a representative consumer, and our previous results (Huang and Werner (2000)), from the setting of
no uncertainty and a single security, to the general setting of multiple consumers,
multiple securities, and uncertainty.

Wright (1987) studied implementation in

infinite-time economies with one-period-lived securities.
The crucial aspect of implementation in infinite-time security markets is the
choice of feasibility constraints on agents' portfolio strategies. A feasibility con-
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straint has to be imposed for otherwise agents would be able to borrow in security
markets and roll over the debt without ever repaying it (Ponzi scheme). However,
the constraint cannot be too "tight" for it could prevent agents from using portfolio strategies that generate wealth transfers necessary to achieve consumption
plans of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Wright (1987) employs the wealth con-

straint which says that a consumer cannot borrow more than the present value
of her future endowments. He proved that exact implementation holds with oneperiod-lived securities- the set of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations and the
set of equilibrium allocations in complete sequential markets are the same.
The difficulty in extending implementation results to infinitely-lived securities
lies in the possibility of price bubbles in sequential markets. Kocherlakota (1992),
Magill and Quinzii (1996), and Huang and Werner (2000) pointed out that the
wealth constraint gives rise to sequential equilibria with price bubbles on securities that are in zero supply. We demonstrate in this paper that, if one does not
exclude negative security prices, then there exist sequential equilibria with price
bubbles under the wealth constraint even if the supply of securities is strictly positive. We prove that Arrow-Debreu equilibria with countably additive prices can be
implemented by trading infinitely-lived securities in complete sequential markets
under the wealth constraint with no price bubbles. That is, the set of ArrowDebreu equilibrium allocations is the same as the set of equilibrium allocations
in sequential markets with no price bubbles. Further, we show that sequential
equilibria with nonzero price bubbles correspond to Arrow-Debreu equilibria with
transfers (and with countably additive prices). Transfers are equal to the value of
price bubbles on agents' initial portfolio holdings.
We consider an alternative portfolio feasibility constraint which requires that
the value of borrowing at normalized security prices be bounded from below.
We call portfolio strategies satisfying this constraint essentially bounded portfolio strategies. This feasibility constraint has a remarkable property that there
cannot be price bubbles in sequential equilibrium regardless of the supply of the
securities. We prove that exact implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibria with
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count ably additive prices (without transfers) holds with essentially bounded portfolio strategies.
It should be emphasized that Arrow-Debreu equilibria that can be implemented

by sequential trading of infinitely-lived securities must have countably additive
prices. It has been known since Bewley (1972) that for some class of economies
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium prices may not be countably additive (for an example,
see Huang and Werner (2000)). Our results indicate that those equilibria cannot
be implemented by sequential trading (except when the equilibrium allocation can
also be supported by countable additive prices).
The concept of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium underlying our analysis is due to
Peleg and Yaari (1970). Equilibrium prices assign finite values to consumption
plans that are positive and do not exceed the aggregate endowment , but rnay or
may not assign finite values to other consumption plans. The Peleg and Yaari
approach should be contrasted with a more standard approach , first proposed
by Debreu (1954) (see also Bewley (1972)), where the consumption space and
the price space are a dual pair of topological vector spaces. Under this second
approach, equilibrium prices assign finite values to all consumption plans in the
consumption space. Sufficient conditions for the existence of Peleg-Yaari equilibria
with countably additive prices can be found in Peleg and Yaari (1970). Aliprantis,
Brown and Burkinshaw (1987, 1990) provide an analysis of Peleg-Yaari equilibria
in general consumption spaces.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we provide specification of time
and uncertainty. In section 3 we introduce the notion of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium and in section 4 we define a sequential equilibrium in security markets. We
assume that there is a finite number of infinitely-lived agents and a finite nUInber
of infinitely-lived securities available for trade at every date. In sections 5 and 6 we
state and prove our basic implementation results. In section 7 we discuss portfolio
constraints other then the two constraints mentioned above. This discussion relies
on the work of Hernandez and Santos (1994) and Magill and Quinzii (1996).
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2. Time and Uncertainty
Time is discrete with infinite horizon and indexed by t

= 0,1 .... Uncertainty

is described by a set S of states of the world and an increasing sequence of finite
partitions

{Fd~o

of S. A state s E S specifies a complete history of the environ-

ment from date 0 to the infinite future. The partition F t specifies sets of states
that can be verified by the information available at date t. An element st E F t is
called a date-t event. We take Fo

=S

so that there is no uncertainty at date O.

This description of the uncertain environment can be interpreted as an event
tree. An event st
date 0 event

SO

E

F t at date t identifies a node of the event tree. The unique

is the root node of the event tree. The set of all events at all dates

is denoted by £. For each node st there is a set of immediate successors and (with
exception of the root node) a unique predecessor. The unique predecessor of st is
a date-(t -1) event s~

E

F t - 1 such that st

date-(t+1) event st+l such that st+l

E

C s~.

An immediate successor of st is a

F t +1 and st+l C st. The set of all immediate

successors of st is denoted by F t +1 (st) and the number of immediate successors st

< 00, and denote that supremum by K.
The set of all date-T successor events of st for T > t, that is all date-T events

by ~(st). We assume that

ST

E

SUPstEc ~(st)

FT with ST cst, is denoted by FT(St). The set of successor events of st at all

dates after t is denoted by £+(st). We also write £(st) == {st} U £+(st).

3. Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
There is a single consumption good. A consumption plan is a scalar-valued
process adapted to {Ft}~o' Consumption plans are restricted to lie in a linear
space C of adapted processes. Our primary choice of the consumption space C is
the space of all adapted processes (which can be identified with ROO). The cone
of nonnegative processes in C is denoted by C+; a typical element of C is denoted
by c = {c(st)}.
There are I consumers. Each consumer i has the consumption set C+, a strictly
increasing and complete preference j i on C+, and an initial endowment
The aggregate endowment

=

w I:i wi is assumed

positive, that is, W ~ O.

wi E

C+.
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The standard notion of an Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium is extended to our
setting with infinitely many dates as follows: Prices are described by linear functional P which is positive and well-defined (i.e., finite valued) on each consumer's
initial endowment. We call such functional a pricing functional. It follows that
a pricing functional is well-defined on the aggregate endowment wand, since it is
positive, also on each attainable consumption plan , that is, on each c satisfying

o ::; c ::; w.

I t mayor may not be well-defined on the en tire space C.

The price of one unit consumption in event st under pricing functional P is

p(st) _ P(e(st)), where e(st) denotes the consumption plan equal to 1 in event st
at date t and zero in all other events and all other dates. A pricing functional P
is countably additive if and only if P(c)

= 2:£ p(st)c(st)

for every c for which P(c)

is well-defined.
An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a pricing functional P and a consumption
allocation {ci} such that ci maximizes consumer i's preference ::;i subject to P(c) ::;
P(w i ) and c E C+, and markets clear, that is 2:i ci = 2:i wi. An equilibrium pricing
functional is normalized so that p( SO)

= 1.

As noted in the introduction, this concept of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is due
to Peleg and Yaari (1970) who also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equilibrium with countably additive pricing functional when the consurnption
space is C

= Roo.

The conditions are the standard monotonicity and convexity of

preferences, as well as continuity of preferences in the product topology.
We will also need the notion of an equilibrium with transfers. For given transfers {Ei} such that 2:i Ei

=

0, a pricing functional P (with p(SO)

= 1) and a

consumption allocation {c i } are an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with transfers if ci
maximizes consumer i's preference::;i subject to P(c) ::; P(Wi)+Ei and c E C+, and
markets clear. Peleg and Yaari (1970) conditions also imply that an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium with transfers exists for small transfers.

4. Sequential Equilibrium and Price Bubbles
We consider J infinitely-lived securities traded at every date. We assume that
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the number of securities is greater than or equal to the number of immediate

successors of every event, that is, J

~

K. Each security j is specified by a dividend

process dj which is adapted to {Ft}~o and nonnegative. The ex-dividend price of
security j in event st is denoted by qj(st), and qj is the price process of security
j. Portfolio strategy 0 specifies a portfolio of J securities O( st) held after trade in

each event st. The payoff of portfolio strategy 0 in event st for t ~ 1 at a price
process q is

(1)
Each consumer i has an initial portfolio a i at date O. The dividend stream aid
on initial portfolio constitutes one part of consumer i's endowment. The rest is
yi E C and becomes available to the consumer at each date in every event. Thus

it holds

(2)
The supply of securities is

a = Li a i .

We assume that

a ~ O.

Consumers face feasibility constraints when choosing their portfolio strategies.
Such constraints are necessary to prevent consumers from using Ponzi schemes (see
Huang and Werner (2000)). In the definition of sequential equilibrium the set of
feasible portfolio strategies of consumer i is

e i . Specific feasibility constraints will

be introduced in sections 5 and 6.
A sequential equilibrium is a price process q and consumption-portfolio alloca-

tion {ci , Oi} such that:
(i) for each i, consumption plan ci and portfolio strategy Oi maximize ::ji subject
to

c(SO)

+ q(sO)O(SO)

::; yi(sO)

c( st) ::; yi (st) + Z (q, 0) (st)
c E C+, 0 E

ei ;

+ q(sO)ai ,
Vst 1= so,
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(ii) markets clear, that is

Security price process q is one-period arbitrage free in event st if there does not
exist a portfolio O(st) such that [q(st+l)+d(st+l)]O(st) ;2: 0 for every st+l

E

Ft+l(St)

and q( st)O( st) :; 0, with at least one strict inequality. 2 It is well known that if q
is arbitrage free in every event, then there exist a sequence of strictly posi tive
numbers {7r(st)} with 7r(SO)

= 1 such that
(3)

We call such 7r a system of event prices associated with q.
Security markets are one-period complete in event st at prices q if the oneperiod payoff matrix {q( st+l) +d( st+l)} st+lEFt+J(st) has rank equal to "'( st). Security
markets are complete at q if they are one-period complete at every event. Of course,
the assumed condition that J ;2: K is necessary for markets to be complete.
If markets are complete at q, then for each event st there exists a portfolio

strategy that has payoff equal to one at st, zero in every other event and involves
no portfolio holding after date t. If q is one-period arbitrage free , then the date-O
price of that portfolio strategy is 7r(st) which justifies the term event price.
Suppose that security prices q are one-period arbitrage free and that markets
are complete at q. Then the present value of security j at st can be defined using
event prices as

(4)
If the price of security j is nonnegative in every event, then the sum (4) is finite

for every st. To see this, we use (3) recursively to obtain

(5)
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for each st, and for any T > t. If qj(st) ;::: 0, then (5) implies that

q;(st)

~ 7r(~t)

T

L L

7r(sT)d;(ST)

(6)

T=t+l s'TE.r'T(st)

for every st and T > t. Taking the limit on the right hand side of (6) as T goes to
infinity and using dj(ST) ;::: 0, we obtain that the present value (4) is less than or
equal to the price of the security.
We do not exclude the possibility of security prices being negative. Absence
of one-period arbitrage does not imply that security prices are nonnegative even if
dividends are nonnegative. 3 A way to exclude negative security prices is to assume
free disposal of securities (see Santos and Woodford (1997)) ,4
If the present value of a security is finite, then the difference between the price

and the present value is the price bubble on that security. We denote the price
bubble on security j in event st by aj(st). That is

O";(st) _ q;(st) -

7r(~t)

L

7r(sT)d;(ST).

(7)

s'TEc+(st)

Note that if the price of security j is nonnegative in every event, then 0 ~ aj (st) ~

qj (st) for every st. Also, if the present value of security j is finite and aj (st) ;::: 0
for every st, then qj (st) ;::: 0 for every st.
For use later, we note that (5) and (7) imply that

O";(st) =

7r(~t)

L

7r(st+l)O";(St+l),

(8)

st+l E.rt+l (st)

and also that
(9 )
for each st.
Whether nonzero price bubbles can exist in a sequential equilibrium depends
crucially on the form of portfolio feasibility constraints (see Huang and Werner

(2000)), Under the wealth constraint (Section 5) nonzero equilibrium price bubbles
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are possible but they are not possible under the constraint of essentially bounded
portfolio strategies (Section 6).

5. Implementation with the Wealth Constraint.
A frequently used portfolio feasibility constraint is the wealth constraint . It
applies to complete security markets where event prices can be uniquely defined. 5
It prohibits a consumer from borrowing more than the present value of his future

endowment. Formally, portfolio strategy () satisfies the wealth constraint if
(10)
We refer to a sequential equilibrium in which each consumer i's set of feasible
portfolio strategies consists of all portfolio strategies satisfying (10) as a sequential
equilibrium under the wealth constraint.
We begin with two theorerns that establish equivalence between countably additive Arrow-Debreu equilibria and sequential equilibria with no price bubbles. All
proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.

Theorem 5.1. Let consumption allocation {c i } and pricing functio nal P be

an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. If P is countably additive, P(dj ) <

00

for each j ,

and security markets are complete at prices q given by
t .
vS ,),

\..I

(11)

then there exists a portfolio allocation {()i} such that q and the allocation {ci , ()i}
are a sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint.
Theorem 5.1 says that an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium with count ably additive
pricing can be implemented by sequential trading under the wealth constraint at
security prices defined as the present value of future dividends (and thus with zero
bubbles), provided that security markets are complete.
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Our next result says that the implementation of countably additive ArrowDebreu equilibria is exact when attention is restricted to sequential equilibria with
no price bubbles.
Theorem 5.2 Let secuTity prices q and consumption-portfolio allocation {ci , Oi}

be a sequential equilibrium under the wealth constTaint. If security markets aTe
complete at q and price bubbles are zero, then consumption allocation {ci } and the
pricing functional P given by
P(c)

=L

(12)

7r(st)c(st)

stE£

are an A rrow- Debreu equilibrium.
Note that the pricing functional defined by (12) is count ably additive.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 concern only sequential equilibria with no price bubbles.
We show next that there are sequential equilibria under the wealth constraint with
nonzero price bubbles, and that they correspond to count ably additive ArrowDebreu equilibria with transfers.
Theorem 5.3. Let consumption allocation {c i } and pricing functional P be

an Arrow-DebTeu equilibrium with transfers {p(sO)a i } JOT arbitrary p(SO)
satisfying p( sO)a = O. If P is countably additive, P( dj ) <

E

RJ

for each j, and

00

security markets aTe complete at prices q given by
\...J

vs

wheTe {p( st)} satisfies p( st)a

pj(st) =

p(~t)

=0

t

,),.

(13)

.

(14)

and

L

p(St+l)pj(st+1),

\...J

vS

t

,J,

sHl EFt+l (st)

then there exists a portfolio allocation {Oi} such that q and allocation {ci , Oi} are
a sequential equilibTium under the wealth constraint.
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Theorem 5.3 says that every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation with transfers that are proportional to initial portfolios and with countably additive pricing
can be implemented by sequential trading under the wealth constraint at securi ty
prices with price bubbles, provided that security markets are complete. Price bubbles at date 0 are determined by the transfers (via O'(SO)
at future dates (given by O'(st)

= p(SO)). Price bubbles

= p(st)) have to satisfy the "martingale" property

(14) and the requirement that the price bubble on the supply of securities is zero,
bu t are otherwise arbitrary.
This arbitrariness in choosing price bubbles is important. If the number of
securities is greater than or equal to K + 1, or if securities are in zero supply, then
the sequence {p( st)} can be selected (with p( st) =f. 0 for all st) so that markets are
complete at security prices defined by (13).
The implementation of countably additive Arrow-Debreu equilibria with transfers is exact.
Theorem 5.4.

Let security prices q and consumption-poTtfolio allocation

{d, Bi} be a sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint. If security rnaTkets aTe complete at q and

LstEc

7r( st)dj (st) <

00

for each j, then consumption

allocation {c i } and the pricing functional P given by

P(c) =

L 7r(st)c(st)

(15)

stEc

aTe an Arrow-DebTeu equilibrium with transfers {O'(sO)a i }. It holds O'(sO)a

= O.

Together, Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 say that count ably additive Arrow-Debreu
equilibria with transfers that are proportional to initial portfolios of securities can
be implemented in exact fashion by trading in sequential markets under the wealth
constraint. That transfer are proportional to initial portfolios is important. For
instance, if initial portfolios are all zero, then only Arrow-Debreu equilibria without
transfers can be implemented in sequential markets.
Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 provide a complete characterization of sequential equilibria in complete security markets under the wealth constraint. There are multiple
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equilibria and they are parametrized by p seen in Theorem 5.3. Different vectors

p( SO) correspond in general to different equilibrium consumption allocations; different sequences {p( st) h~ l correspond to different security prices, but they have no
effect on consumption allocations. If one is willing to restrict attention to posi tive
security prices and therefore positive price bubbles, the multiplicity of sequential
equilibria is partially reduced as p has to be positive. In one case, the multiplicity
is eliminated: If the supply of securities is strictly positive that is, if a »0 then

ap(st) = 0 and p( st)

~

0 imply that p( st) = 0, for every st. In other words, there

cannot be positive price bubbles in sequential equilibrium if the supply of securities
is strictly positive (see Santos and Woodford (1997)).

6. Implementation with Essentially Bounded Portfolios.
We have shown in section 5 that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be implemented
by trading infinitely-lived securities under the wealth constraint. The possibility
of price bubbles under the wealth constraint implies that- unless each consumer's
initial portfolio is zero-

there are equilibria in security markets other than the

Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. In this section we propose an alternative portfolio
feasibility constraint under which Arrow-Debreu equilibria can be implemented in
security markets but price bubbles cannot arise.
Portfolio strategy

e is bounded from

below if

(16)
Portfolio strategy

eis essentially bounded from below at q if there exists a bounded

from below portfolio strategy b such that
(17)
We refer to a (essentially) bounded from below portfolio strategies simply as (essentially) bounded portfolio strategy. Of course, every bounded portfolio strategy
is essentially bounded but the converse is not true (unless there is a single securi ty ).
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The set of essentially bounded portfolio strategies is a convex cone, that is, the
sum of any two essentially bounded portfolio strategies and any positive multiple
of an essentially bounded portfolio strategy is essentially bounded.
If security price vector q( st) is positive and nonzero for every event st, then
portfolio strategy B is essentially bounded if and only if

(18)
where q(st) == q(st)/ ~j qj(st) is the normalized security price vector. 6
We refer to sequential equilibrium in which each consumer's set of feasible
portfolios is the set of essentially bounded portfolio strategies (17) as a sequential
equilibrium with essentially bounded portfolios.

It is crucial for the results in this section that the portfolio feasibility constraint is stated in the form (17).
infst q(st)B(st) >

-00,

Neither the bounded borrowing constraint

nor (16) deliver the same results. Only if there is a sin-

gle security, (17) and (16) are equivalent, and in that sense the results of this
section extend Theorem 9.1 in Huang and Werner (2000).
Before presenting the implementation results we prove that there cannot be a
nonzero price bubble in sequential equilibrium with essentially bounded portfolios.
All proofs in this section have been relegated to the Appendix.

Theorem 6.1. If q is a sequential equilibrium price process with essentially

bo'unded portfolios and if security markets are complete at q, then qj(st)

~ 0

and

(Jj (st) = 0 for every j and every st.
That the price of each security has to be positive follows from the fact that a
portfolio strategy of short-selling the security and never buying it back is bounded.
If the price were negative , then each consumer could short-sell the securi ty (and
do so at an arbitrary scale) and make an arbitrage profit. This is incompatible
with an equilibrium. A similar arbitrage argument implies that price bubbles are
zero. For each security there is an essentially bounded portfolio strategy with initial
investment equal to the negative of the price bubble and zero payoff in every future

14
event. If the price bubble were positive (it cannot be negative as shown in Section

4) each consumer could make an arbitrage profit of arbitrary scale. A detailed
proof can be found in the Appendix.
The following two theorems demonstrate that count ably additive Arrow-Debreu
equilibria (without transfers) can be implemented by sequential trading with essentially bounded portfolios in exact fashion.

Theorem 6.2. Let consumption allocation {c i } and pricing functional P be

an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. If P is countably additive, P(dj ) <

00

for each j,

security markets are complete at prices q given by
\..I

vS

and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy

'f}

t

.

,J,

(19)

such that
(20)

then there exists a portfolio allocation {Oi} such that q and the allocation {ci , Oil
are a sequential equilibrium with essentially bounded portfolios.
Condition (20) says that it is feasible to borrow an amount greater than or equal
to the present value of aggregate future endowment using an essentially bounded
portfolio strategy. Equivalently, it is feasible for each consumer to borrow the
present value of his endowment using an essentially bounded portfolio strategy.
Under condition (20), the set of all essentially bounded portfolio strategies includes
all strategies satisfying the wealth constraint.

Theorem 6.3.

Let security prices q and consumption-portfolio allocation

{Ci,Oi} be a sequential equilibrium with essentially bounded portfolios. If security
markets are complete at q and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy
'f}

such that

(21)
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then consumption allocation {c

i

}

and pricing functional P given by

P(c) =

L 7r(st)c(st)

(22)

stEc
are an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.

One can show that, for condition (21) to hold, it is sufficient that there exists
a bounded from above and from below portfolio strategy b such that y( st) ~

z(q, b)(st) for all st. For this latter condition, it is sufficient that y is bounded
relative to d, that is, that y( st) ~ ,d( st) for some, E R/, for all st.
7. Other Portfolio Constraints.
An often used feasibility constraint on portfolio strategies is the transversality
condition. In our setting the transversality condition is written as

(23)
Hernandez and Santos (1994) proved that consumers' budget sets in sequential
markets are the same under the wealth constraint and the transversality condition, as long as Z=stEc 7r(st)yi(st) < 00. Therefore, all implementation results of
Section 5 remain valid when the wealth constraint is replaced by the transversality
condition (and under an additional assumption that Z=stEc7r(st)y(st) < 00).
Hernandez and Santos (1994) and Magill and Quinzii (1996) provide other
specifications of portfolio constraints that lead to the same budget sets as the
wealth constraint. For further discussion of equivalent portfolio constraints in the
setting with one-period-lived securities, see Florenzano and Gourdel (1996), Magill
and Quinzii (1994) and Levine and Zame (1996).
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Appendix.

We start by proving a lemma concerning relation between budget sets in sequential markets under the wealth constraint and in Arrow-Debreu markets. We
recall that 7r denotes a system of event prices associated with given security prices

q, while p denotes a system of event prices associated with given pricing functional

P.
Let Bw (q; yi, a i ) denote the set of budget feasible consumption plans in sequential markets at prices q under the wealth constraint, when the consumer's consumption endowment is yi and his initial portfolio is a i . That is, c E Bw (q; yi, a i ) if
c E C+ and there exists a portfolio strategy 0 such that

+ q(sO)ai ,
yi(st) + z(q, O)(st)
Vst i= so,

c(SO)

+ q(SO)O(SO)

c(st)

~

~

q(st)O(st) ~ __1_
7r(st)

yi(sO)

(24)

~ 7r(ST)yi(ST)
~

sTE£+(st)

Let BAD (P; wi, Ei) denote the set of budget feasible consumption plans in ArrowDebreu markets at P when the consumer's consumption endowment is wi and his
transfer is

Ei.

That is,

C

E BAD(P;

wi, Ei) if C E C+ and

(25)
The budget set with zero transfer BAD(P; Wi, 0) is denoted by BAD(P; wi).
Throughout the Appendix, endowments

wi, yi

and a i are related by (2), that

is,

(26)
Lemma A.1. Let P be a countably additive pricing functional and q a market-

completing system of security prices. If
(27)
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and P(yi) <

00,

P(d j ) <

for each i and j, then

00

(28)

Proof: Suppose that c E Bw(q; yi, (i).

Multiplying both sides of the budget

constraint (24) at st by 7r(st) and summing over all st for t ranging from 0 to
arbitrary

T,

and using (3), we obtain

T

L L 7r(st)c(st) + L

tL
t=O

<

T

7r(ST)q(ST)B(ST) ~

'/r(st)c(st)

stEFt

+

L

L L 7r(st)yi(st) + q(sO)a

[7r(ST)q(ST)B(ST)

srEFr

+

L

i

.

(29 )

7r(st)yi(st)]

stEt:+(sr)

L 7r(st)yi(st) + q(sO)ai.

(30)

stEt:

The sum

2::s tE £

7r(st)yi(st) is finite by assumption. If the use is made of the wealth

constraint, (30) implies that
T

L L 7r(st)c(st) ~ L 7r(st)yi(st) + q(sO)(i
Taking limi ts in (31) as

T

(31)

goes to infinity yields
(32)

Since

2::stEt:

7r(st)dj (st) is assumed finite for every j, the price bubble O"(SO) is

well-defined. If the use is made of (7) and (26), inequality (32) can be written as
(33)
or simply as

(34)
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Thus c E BAD(P; wi, (Xia(sO)).
Suppose now that c E BAD (P; Wi, (Xia( SO)). Since security markets are complete
at q, for each st there exists portfolio () (st) such that

(35)
Note that the sum on the right-hand side of (35) is finite since L:sTE£(st+l) 7r(ST)C(ST) :::;

P(c). Multiplying both sides of (35) by 7r(st+l), summing over all st+l

E

Ft+l(St),

and using (3), we obtain
(36)

It follows from (35) and (36) that

(37)
Thus c and () satisfy the sequential budget constraint (24) at each st =J so. To
show that the budget constraint at SO also holds we use the equivalence of (34)
and (32). Equation (36) for SO and (32) imply the date-O budget constraint

(38)
Since c 2 0, equation (36) implies that () satisfies the wealth constraint. Thus
c E Bw(q; yi, (Xi) 0

Proof of Theorem 5.1: For the system of security prices q defined by (11), the
associated event prices satisfy (27) and price bubbles are zero. Since P(w i ) <
and P(d j )

<

00,

it follows that P(yi)

<

00.

00

Therefore, Lemma A.l implies that

the budget set in sequential markets at q equals the Arrow-Debreu budget set
with zero transfer. Hence, consumption plan ci is optimal for each i in sequential
markets. It remains to be shown that portfolio strategies that generate the optimal
consumption plans clear security markets.
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Let gi be portfolio strategy defined by (35) with ci , that is, satisfying

(39)
for each st and each i. Such portfolio strategy generates consumption plan ci and
satisfies i's the wealth constraint. Summing (39) over all i and using

Li ci

=

LiWi

and (26), we obtain

(40)
It follows from (11) and (40) that

(41)
If there are no securities with redundant one-period payoffs, then (41) implies that

(42)
Otherwise, if there are redundant securities, then portfolio strategies {gi} can be
modified without changing their payoffs so that (42) holds.D
Proof of Theorem 5.2: In a sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint
the present value

7r(;t) LSTE£+(st)

1r(sT)yi(ST) must be finite, for otherwise there

would not exist an optimal portfolio strategy for consumer i. Therefore p(yi) <
Further, since price bubbles are zero, it follows that P(d j ) <

00

00.

(see Section 4).

Lamma A.1 can be applied and it implies the conclusion. 0
Proof of Theorem 5.3: If security prices defined by (13) are market completing,
then the associated system of event prices is unique and satisfies (27), and price
bubbles are

(J

= p.

As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, one can show that p(yi) <

00.

It follows from Lemma A.1 that each consumption plan ci is optimal in sequential

markets.
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The proof that portfolio strategies that generate the optimal consumption plans

also clear security markets is the same as in Theorem 5.1 with one minor modification. With security prices defined by (13), we obtain the following equation
instead of (41):

[q(st)

+ d(st)]

However, since p(st)a

=

[~(i(S~) -

a] = -p(st)a

(43)

0, equation (41) does hold and the rest of the proof of

Theorem 5.1 applies.
Proof of Theorem 5.4: The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 5.2
implies that p(yi) <

It follows immediately from Lemma A.1 that pricing

00.

functional P and consumption allocation {ci} are an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
with transfers {a(sO)a i }. That the transfers add up to zero (or, equivalently, price
bubble on the aggregate portfolio is zero) follows from Walras' Law
(44)
and market-clearing

Li ci = Li wi.

0

Proof of Theorem 6.1: We first show that q 2 O. Suppose, by contradiction, that

qj (st) < 0 for some security j and event st. Let ci be equilibrium consumption plan
and

()i

equilibrium portfolio strategy of consumer i. Consider a portfolio strategy {)i

that results from holding

()i

and purchasing one share of security j in event st and

holding it forever. Since

()i

is essentially bounded,

()i

is essentially bounded , too.

Further, since qj(st) < 0 and d j 2 0, portfolio strategy {)i generates a consumption
plan that is greater than or equal to ci in every event and strictly greater in event

st. This contradicts the optimality of ci .
We can now assume that q 2 O. It follows from the discussion in Section 4 that
the present value (4) of each security is finite and the price bubble is well-defined
and nonnegative in every event. To prove that a(st)
show that a(sO)

= O. The rest follows from (8).

= 0 for every t it suffices to
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Since security markets are complete at q, for each event st and each security .7
there exists a portfolio ~j (st) such that
(45)

Multiplying both sides of (45) by 7r(st+l), summing over all st+l E Ft+l(St) and
using (3) we obtain
(46)
Since dj ~ 0, it follows that q( st)~j (st) ~ O. Therefore ~j is essentially bounded.
Using (45) and (46), we obtain

(47)
Thus , the payoff of ~j equals the dividend dj , that is z(q, ~j) = d j . Date-O price of
~j is the present value of dj (see (46)).

Let

rf

denote a portfolio strategy of selling one share of security j at date 0

and never buying it back. We have

(48)
and

(49)
Consider portfolio strategy {)i

=

()i

+ ~j + rf.

Since strategies ()i, ~j and

essentially bounded, ()i is essentially bounded, too. If aj (SO)

> 0,

rf

are

then ()i generates

a consumption plan that is strictly greater than ci at date 0 and equal to ci in all
future events. This would contradict optimality of ci. Therefore

aj

(SO) = O.

0

Before proving Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 we establish a lemma concerning relation between budget sets in sequential markets with essentially bounded portfolio
strategies and in Arrow-Debreu markets.

22
Let Bb (q; yi, a i ) denote the set of budget feasible consumption plans in sequential markets at prices q with essentially bounded portfolio strategies, when the consumption endowment is yi and the initial portfolio is a i . That is, c E Bb (q; yi, a i )
if c E C+ and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy 0 such that

(50)
We have

Lemma A.2. Let P be a countably additive pricing functional and q

~

0 a

market-completing system of security prices such that a = O. If

(51)
and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy TJ such that
(52)

then

(53)

Proof: Let c E Bb(q; yi, a i ). As in the proof of Lemma A.I, budget constraint
(50) implies (29). Taking limits in (29) as

L 1f(st)c(st) + li~~f L
stE£

T

goes to infinity, we obtain

1f(ST)q(ST)O(ST) ::;

sTEfT

L 1f(st)yi(st) + q(sO)ai.

(54)

stE£

Note that (52) for SO implies that

L 1f(st)yi(st) ::; yi(sO) -

q(SO)TJ(SO)

(55)

stE£

(56)
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Since () is essentially bounded, it follows that
(57)
for some bounded portfolio strategy b. Since O"j(SO)
as

T

= 0,

(9) implies that the limit,

goes to infinity, of the right-hand side of (57) is positive.

Inequalities (56) and (54) imply (32), that is
(58)
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma A.l we can rewrite (58) as

(59)
Thus c E BAO(P; wi).
Suppose now that c E BAD(P; Wi). In the proof of Lemrna A.l we constructed
a portfolio strategy that generates c at security prices q and satisfies the wealth
constraint. That is,

(60)
Using (52) we obtain

(61)
which implies that () is essentially bounded. Consequently, c E Bb (q; yi, a i ). 0

Proof of Theorem 6.2: Lemma A.2 implies that consumption plan d is optimal for each i in sequential markets un de the constraint of essentially bounded
portfolio strategies. The proof that portfolio strategies that generate the optimal
consumption plans clear security markets is the same as in Theorem 5.1. 0

Proof of Theorem 6.3: It follows immediately from Lemma A.2.

0
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Footnotes
1

We acknowledge helpful discussions with Roko Aliprantis, Subir Chattopayd-

hyay, Steve LeRoy and seminar participants at University of Pennsylvania, NBER
Workshop in General Equilibrium Theory, SITE 2000, and the 2000 World Congress
of the Econometric Society.
2

Note that one-period arbitrage is defined without any reference to the port-

folio feasibility constraint. Of the two constraints considered in this paper, the
constraint of essentially bounded strategies (Section 6) does not restrict portfolio
holdings in any single event while the wealth constraint (Section 5) does. Yet, it
remains true that there cannot be a one-period arbitrage in sequential equilibrium
under the wealth constraint (see Santos and Woodford (1997)).
3

We show later in the paper that negative security prices are possible in sequential

equilibrium under the wealth constraint but not with essentially bounded portfolio
strategies.
4

The assumption of free disposal is prohibitively restrictive for many securities.

For example, futures markets would not exist if futures contracts could be freely
disposed.
5

Santos and Woodford (1997) extend the wealth constraint to incomplete markets.

6

If 0 satisfies (17) and q 2:: 0, then q(st)O(st) 2:: [Lj qj(st)]Q, where Q= infstj bj(st).

Hence q(st)O(st) is bounded below. Conversely, if 0 satisfies (18), then q(st)O(st) 2::
B for some B E R. With bj(st)

= B for each j and st, 0 satisfies (17).

IMPLEMENTING ARROW-DEBREU EQUILIBRIA
BY TRADING INFINITELY-LIVED SECURITIES l

By Kevin X.D. Huang and Jan Werner

Abstract
We show that Arrow-Debreu equilibria with countably additive prices in infinitetime economy under uncertainty can be implemented by trading infinitely-lived
securities in complete sequential markets under two different portfolio feasibility
constraints: wealth constraint, and essentially bounded portfolios. Sequential equilibria with no price bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria, while those with
price bubbles implement Arrow-Debreu equilibria with transfers. Transfers are
equal to the value of price bubbles on initial portfolio holdings. Price bubbles may
arise in sequential equilibrium under the wealth constraint, but with essentially
bounded portfolios.

Keywords: Arrow-Debreu equilibrium; security markets equilibrium; price bubbles; transfers.

1. Introduction
Equilibrium models of dynamic competitive economies extending over infinite
time play an important role in contemporary economic theory. The basic solution concept for such models is the Arrow-Debreu (or Walrasian) equilibrium. In
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium it is assumed that agents simultaneously trade arbitrary
consumption plans for the entire infinite and state-contingent future. In applied
work, on the other hand, a different market structure and equilibrium concept
are used: instead of trading arbitrary consumption plans at a single date, agents
trade securities in sequential markets at every date in every event. The importance
of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium rests on the possibility of implementing equilibrium
allocations by trading suitable securities in sequential markets.
The idea of implementing an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation by trading
sec uri ties takes its origin in the classical paper by Arrow (1964). Arrow proved
that every Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocation in a two-date economy can be
irnplemented by trading in complete security markets at the first date and spo t
commodity markets at every date in every event. The implementation is exactthe sets of equilibrium allocations in the two market structures are exactly the
same. Arrow's result can be easily extended to a multidate economy with finite
time-horizon. Duffie and Huang (1985) proved that Arrow-Debreu equilibria can
be implemented by trading securities in continuous-time finite-horizon economy.
In this paper we study implementation of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations
by sequential trading of infinitely-lived securities in an infinite-time economy. Our
results extend those of Kandori (1988), from the setting of a representative consumer, and our previous results (Huang and Werner (2000)), from the setting of
no uncertainty and a single security, to the general setting of multiple consumers,
multiple securities, and uncertainty.

Wright (1987) studied implementation in

infinite-time economies with one-period-lived securities.
The crucial aspect of implementation in infinite-time security markets is the
choice of feasibility constraints on agents' portfolio strategies. A feasibility
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